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Abstract. Providing assurances for self-adaptive systems is challenging. A 
primary underlying problem is uncertainty that may stem from a variety of dif-
ferent sources, ranging from incomplete knowledge to sensor noise and uncer-
tain behavior of humans in the loop. Providing assurances that the self-adaptive 
system complies with its requirements calls for an enduring process spanning 
the whole lifetime of the system. In this process, humans and the system jointly 
derive and integrate new evidence and arguments, which we coined perpetual 
assurances for self-adaptive systems. In this paper, we provide a background 
framework and the foundation for perpetual assurances for self-adaptive sys-
tems. We elaborate on the concrete challenges of offering perpetual assurances, 
requirements for solutions, realization techniques and mechanisms to make so-
lutions suitable. We also present benchmark criteria to compare solutions. We 
then present a concrete exemplar that researchers can use to assess and compare 
approaches for perpetual assurances for self-adaptation.    
1   Introduction 
In recent years, researchers have started studying the impact of self-adaptation on the 
software engineering process [1][7][44]. This led to the insight that todayÕs iterative, 
incremental, and evolutionary software engineering processes do not meet the re-
quirements of many contemporary systems that need to handle change during system 
operation. In self-adaptive systems change activities are shifted from development 
time to runtime, and the responsibility for these activities is shifted from software 
engineers or system administrators to the system itself. Therefore the traditional 
boundary between development time and runtime blurs, which requires a complete 
reconceptualization of the software engineering process. An important aspect of the 
software engineering process of self-adaptive systems Ð in particular business or safe-
ty critical systems Ð is providing new evidence that the system requirements are satis-
fied during its entire lifetime, from inception to and throughout operation. This evi-
dence must be produced despite the uncertainty that affects the requirements and/or 
the behavior of the environment, which lead to changes that may affect the system, its 
goals, and its environment [22][27]. To provide guarantees that the system require-
ments are satisfied, the state of the art in self-adaptive systems advocates the use of 
formal models as one promising approach, see e.g., [13][32][41][65][66][72]. Some 
approaches employ formal methods to provide guarantees by construction. More 
recently, the use of probabilistic models to handle uncertainties has gained interest. 
These models are used to verify properties and support decision-making about adapta-
tion at runtime. However, providing assurances that the goals of self-adaptive systems 
are achieved during the entire life cycle remains a difficult challenge.   
In this paper, we provide a background framework and the foundation for an approach 
to providing assurances for self-adaptive systems that we coined Òperpetual assuranc-
es for self-adaptive systems.Ó We elaborate on the challenges of perpetual assurances, 
requirements for solutions, realization techniques and mechanisms to make solutions 
suitable, and benchmark criteria to compare solutions. We then present a case study 
that researchers can use to assess, challenge and compare their approaches to provid-
ing assurances for self-adaptation. The paper concludes with a summary of the main 
challenges we identified to realize perpetual assurances for self-adaptive systems.    
2   Key Challenges for Perpetual Assurances  
We use the following working definition for assurances for self-adaptive systems:  
Assurances for self-adaptive systems mean providing evidence for requirements 
compliance; this evidence can be provided off-line (i.e., not directly connected or 
controlled by the running system) and complemented online (i.e., connected or 
under control of the running system).  
 
We use the following working definition for perpetual assurances for self-adaptive 
systems: 
 
Perpetual assurances for self-adaptive systems mean providing evidence for re-
quirements compliance through an enduring process that continuously provides 
new evidence by combining system-driven and human-driven activities to deal 
with the uncertainties that the system faces across its lifetime, from inception to 
and throughout operation in the real world.  
 
Thus, providing assurances cannot be achieved by simply using off-line solutions 
possibly complemented with online solutions. Instead, we envisage that perpetual 
assurances will employ a continuous process where humans and the system jointly 
and continuously derive and integrate new evidence and arguments required to assure 
stakeholders (e.g., end users and system administrators) that the requirements are met 
by the self-adaptive system despite the uncertainties it faces throughout its lifetime.  
Realizing the vision of perpetual assurances for self-adaptive systems poses multiple 
challenges, which we discuss next. From these challenges, we identify requirements, 
we overview relevant approaches for assurances and discuss mechanisms to make 
these approaches suitable for perpetual assurances, and finally we define benchmark 
criteria to compare different solutions.  
A primary underlying challenge stems from uncertainty. The literature provides sev-
eral definitions of uncertainty, ranging from absence of knowledge to inadequacy of 
information and the difference between the amount of information required to perform 
a task and the amount of information already possessed [5][35][51][54][62][67]. [62] 
and later [53] refer to uncertainty as any deviation from the unachievable ideal of 
completely deterministic knowledge of the relevant system. Such deviations can lead 
to a lack of confidence in the obtained results, based on a judgment that they might be 
incomplete, blurred, inaccurate, unreliable, inconclusive, or potentially false [55].  
Hereafter, we make use of the taxonomy of uncertainty initially proposed in [53], 
where uncertainties are classified along three dimensions: location, level, and nature. 
The location dimension refers to where uncertainty manifests in the description (the 
model) of the studied system or phenomenon. We can specialize it into: (i) input pa-
rameters,  (ii) model structure, and (iii) context. The level dimension rates how uncer-
tainty occurs along a spectrum ranging from deterministic knowledge (level 0) to total 
ignorance (level 3). Awareness of uncertainty (level 1) and unawareness (level 2) are 
the intermediate levels. The nature dimension indicates whether the uncertainty is due 
to the lack of accurate information (epistemic) or to the inherent variability of the 
phenomena being described (aleatory). Other taxonomies of uncertainties related to 
different modeling aspects can be found [8][38][54]. 
Recognizing the presence of uncertainty and managing it can mitigate its potentially 
negative effects and increase the level of assurance in a given self-adaptive system. 
By ignoring uncertainties, one could draw unsupported claims on the system validity 
or generalize them beyond their bounded scope. 
Table 1 Classification of sources of uncertainty based on [50] 
Source of Uncertainty  Classification 
Location Nature 
   
Simplifying assumptions  
 
 
System 
Structural/context Epistemic 
Model drift Structural Epistemic 
Incompleteness Structural Epistemic/Aleatory 
Future parameters value Input Epistemic 
Adaptation functions Structural Epistemic/Aleatory 
Automatic learning Structural/input Epistemic/Aleatory 
Decentralization Context/structural Epistemic 
 
Requirements elicitation  
Goals 
 
Structural/input Epistemic/Aleatory 
Specification of goals Structural/input Epistemic/Aleatory 
Future goal changes Structural/input Epistemic/Aleatory 
 
Execution context  
Context 
Context/structural/ input Epistemic 
Noise in sensing Input Epistemic/Aleatory 
Different sources of information Input Epistemic/Aleatory 
 
Human in the loop 
 
Human 
Context Epistemic/Aleatory 
Multiple ownership Context Epistemic/Aleatory 
 
Table 1 shows a classification of uncertainty based on [50], which is inspired by the 
literature on self-adaptation (e.g., [30][36].) Each source of uncertainty is classified 
according to the location and nature dimensions of the taxonomy. The level dimen-
sion of the taxonomy is not shown in the table since each source of uncertainty can be 
of any level depending on the implemented capabilities in the system that should deal 
with the uncertainty. 
Sources of uncertainty are structured in four groups: (i) sources of uncertainty related 
to the system itself; (ii) uncertainty related to the system goals; (iii) uncertainty in the 
execution context; and (iv) uncertainty related to human aspects. We provide a brief 
definition of each type of uncertainty source, focusing on incompleteness, automated 
learning, and multiple ownership, which especially apply to self-adaptive systems.  
Sources of uncertainty related to the system itself: 
¥ Simplifying assumptions: the model, being an abstraction, includes per-se a de-
gree of uncertainty, since details whose significance is supposed to be minimal 
are not included in the model.  
¥ Model drift: as the system adapts, its structure also changes, so it is necessary to 
keep aligned systems and corresponding models to avoid reasoning on outdated 
models. 
¥ Incompleteness manifests when some parts of the system or its model are know-
ingly missing. Incompleteness can show up at design time and also at runtime. 
Progressive completion at design time occurs in iterative, exploratory develop-
ment processes. Completion at runtime occurs, for example, in dynamic service 
discovery and binding in service-oriented systems. Managing incompleteness is 
challenging. Performing assurance on incomplete systems requires an ability to 
discover which sub-assurances must be delayed until completion occurs, and this 
may even happen at runtime [23]. Consequently, assurance must be incremental 
and comply with the time constraints imposed by the runtime environment.  
¥ Future parameter value: uncertainty in the future world where the system will 
execute creates uncertainties in the correct actions to take at present.  
¥ Automatic learning in self-adaptive systems usually uses statistical processes to 
create knowledge about the execution context and most-useful behaviors. These 
learning processes can lead to applications with uncertain behavior. The location 
of this uncertainty may be in the model structure or input parameters, depending 
on how general the concepts are for which the application has been provided 
with machine-leaning capabilities. The nature of the uncertainty depends on the 
point of view. From the viewpoint of the application and its models of the world, 
as the machine has to learn from imperfect and limited data, the nature of the 
uncertainty is epistemic. From the user viewpoint, since the information under-
goes a statistical learning process during model synthesis, automatic learning in-
troduces randomness in the model and analysis results, and consequently it can 
be seen as an aleatory uncertainty. 
¥ Decentralization: this uncertainty comes from the difficulty to keep a model up-
dated if the system is decentralized and each subsystem has self-adaptation ca-
pabilities. The reason is that it can be hardly expected that any subsystem could 
obtain accurate knowledge of the state of the entire system.  
Sources of uncertainty related to the goals of the system:  
¥ Elicitation of requirements: identifying the needs of stakeholders is known to be 
problematic in practice. Issues concerns defining the system scope, problems in 
fostering understanding among the different communities with a stake in the sys-
tem, and problems in dealing with the volatile nature of requirements. The latter 
issue is particularly relevant for self-adaptation.  
¥ Specification of goals: accurately specifying the preferences of stakeholders is 
difficult and prone to uncertainty. For example, the runtime impact of a utility 
function that defines the desired tradeoffs between conflicting qualities may not 
be completely known upfront.  
¥ Future goal changes: the requirements of the system can change due to new 
needs of the customers, to new regulations or to new market rules, etc. 
 
Sources of uncertainty related to the execution context of the system:  
¥ Execution context: the context in which the application operates should be repre-
sented in the model, but the available monitoring mechanisms might not suffice 
to univocally determine this context and its evolution over time.  
¥ Noise in sensing: the sensors/monitors are not ideal devices and they can pro-
vide, for example, slightly different data in successive measures while the actual 
value of the monitored data did not change.  
 
Sources of uncertainty related to the humans aspects: 
¥ Human in the loop: human behavior is intrinsically uncertain and systems com-
monly rely on correct human operations Ð both as system users and as system 
administrators. This assumption of correct operations may not hold because hu-
man behavior can diverge from the correct behavior.  
¥ Multiple ownership: systems are increasingly assembled out of parts provided by 
different stakeholders, whose exact nature and behavior may be partly unknown 
when the system is composed. This is typical of service-oriented, dynamically 
composed systems, and systems of systems. The nature of this uncertainty is 
mainly epistemic. However, it may also be aleatory since third-party compo-
nents may change without notifying the owner of the integrated application. 
 
As discussed above, uncertainty in its various forms represents as the ultimate 
source of both motivations for and challenges to perpetual assurance. Uncertainty 
manifests through changes. For example, uncertainty in capturing the precise behav-
ior of an input phenomenon to be controlled results in assumptions made to imple-
ment the system. Therefore, the system must be calibrated later when observations 
of the physical phenomenon are made. This in turn leads to changes in the imple-
mented control system that must be scrutinized for assurances. 
3   Requirements for Solutions to Realize Perpetual Assurances  
The provision of perpetual assurance for self-adaptive systems must satisfy additional 
requirements compared to those met by assurance solutions for non-adaptive systems. 
These additional requirements correspond to the challenges summarized in the previ-
ous section. In particular, perpetual assurance solutions must cope with a variety of 
uncertainty sources that depend on the purpose of self-adaptation and the environment 
in which the assured self-adaptive system operates. To this end, they must build and 
continually update their assurance arguments through integrating two types of assur-
ance evidence. The first type of evidence corresponds to system and environment 
elements not affected significantly by uncertainty, and therefore can be obtained using 
traditional offline approaches [47]. The second type of evidence is associated with the 
system and environment components affected by the sources of uncertainty summa-
rized in Table 1. These requirements basically refer to the different functions of adap-
tation: from sensing to monitoring, analyzing, planning, executing, and activating 
[23]. The evidence must be synthesized at runtime, when the uncertainty is treated, 
i.e., be reduced, quantified, or resolved sufficiently, to enable such synthesis. The 
requirements described below stem from this need to treat uncertainty, to generate 
new assurance evidence, and to use it to update existing assurance arguments. 
Requirement 1: A perpetual assurance solution must continually observe the sources 
of uncertainty affecting the self-adaptive system. Without collecting data about the 
relevant sources of uncertainty, the solution cannot acquire the knowledge necessary 
to provide the assurance evidence unachievable offline.
1
  Addressing this requirement 
may necessitate, for instance, the instrumentation of system components, the sensing 
of environmental parameters, and the monitoring of user behavior. 
Requirement 2: A perpetual assurance solution must use its observations of uncer-
tainty sources to continually quantify and potentially reduce the uncertainties affect-
ing its ability to provide assurance evidence. The raw data obtained through observ-
ing the sources of uncertainty need to be used to reduce the uncertainty (e.g., through 
identifying bounds for the possible values of an uncertain parameter). This uncertain-
ty quantification and potential reduction must be sufficient to enable the generation of 
the assurance evidence that could not be obtained offline. For instance, rigorous learn-
ing techniques such as those introduced in [15][17][28][29] can be used to continually 
update formal models whose runtime analysis generates new assurance evidence. 
Requirement 3: A perpetual assurance solution must continually deal with overlap-
ping sources of uncertainty, and may need to treat these sources in a compose-able 
fashion. The sources of uncertainty from Table  1 hardly ever occur apart or inde-
pendently from each other. Instead, their observed effects are often compounded, 
consequently inhibiting the system from clearly assessing the extent to which it satis-
fies its requirements. Therefore, solutions, assurance arguments and the evidence they 
build upon need to be able to tackle composed sources of uncertainty. 
Requirement 4: A perpetual assurance solution must continually derive new assur-
ance evidence. Up-to-date knowledge that reduces the uncertainty inherent within the 
self-adaptive system and its environment must be used to infer the missing assurance 
evidence (e.g., to deal with model drift or handle goal changes as described in Section 
2). As an example, new evidence can be produced through formal verification of 
updated models that reflect the current system behavior [11][12][13][14][32]. Com-
plementary approaches to verification include online testing, simulation, human rea-
soning and combinations thereof. 
Requirement 5: A perpetual assurance solution must continually integrate new evi-
dence into the assurance arguments for the safe behavior of the assured self-
                                                            
1 If all necessary assurance evidence can be derived using knowledge available offline, then we 
managing system. Guaranteeing safe behavior requires the provision of assurance 
arguments that, in the case of self-adaptive systems, must combine offline evidence 
with new evidence obtained online, once uncertainties are resolved to the extent that 
enables the generation of the new evidence. 
Requirement 6: A perpetual assurance solution may need to continually combine 
new assurance evidence synthesized automatically and provided by human experts. 
Developing assurance arguments is a complex process that is carried out by human 
experts and includes the derivation of evidence through both manual and automated 
activities. Online evidence derivation will in general require a similar combination of 
activities, although it is conceivable that self-adaptive systems affected by reduced 
levels and sources of uncertainty might not always be able to assemble all the missing 
evidence automatically.  
Requirement 7: A perpetual assurance solution must provide assurance evidence for 
the system components, the human activities and the processes used to meet the pre-
vious set of requirements. As described above, perpetual assurances for self-adaptive 
systems cannot be achieved without employing system components and a mix of 
automated and manual activities not present in the solutions for assuring non-adaptive 
systems. Each of these new elements will need to be assured either by human-driven 
or machine-driven approaches. As an example, a model checker used to obtain new 
assurance evidence arguments at runtime will need to be certified for this type of use. 
In addition to the functional requirements summarized so far, the provision of perpet-
ual assurance must be timely, non-intrusive and auditable, as described by the follow-
ing non-functional requirements. 
Requirement 8: The activities carried out by a perpetual assurance solution must 
produce timely updates of the assurance arguments. The provision of assurance ar-
guments and of the evidence underpinning them is time consuming. Nevertheless, 
perpetual assurance solutions need to complete updating the assurance arguments 
guaranteeing the safety of a self-adaptive system timely, before the system engages in 
operations not covered by the previous version of the assurance arguments.  
Requirement 9: The activities of the perpetual assurance solution, and their over-
heads must not impact the operation of the assured self-adaptive system. The tech-
niques employed by a perpetual assurance solution (e.g., instrumentation, monitoring 
and online learning, and verification) must not interfere with the ability of the self-
adaptive system to deliver its intended functionality effectively and efficiently. 
Requirement 10: The assurance evidence produced by a perpetual assurance solu-
tion and the associated assurance arguments must be auditable by human stakehold-
ers. Assurance arguments and the evidence they build upon are intended for human 
experts responsible for the decision to use a system, for auditing its safety, and for 
examining what went wrong after failures. In keeping with this need, perpetual assur-
ance solutions must express their new assurance evidence in human-readable format.  
Table 2 summarizes the requirements for perpetual assurance solutions.  
 
Table 2 Summary requirements 
Requirement Brief description 
 
R1: Monitor uncertainty A perpetual assurance solution must continually observe the sources of 
uncertainty affecting the self-adaptive system. 
R2: Quantify uncertainty A perpetual assurance solution must use its observations of uncertainty 
sources to continually quantify and potentially reduce the uncertainties 
affecting its ability to provide assurance evidence. 
R3: Manage overlapping 
uncertainty sources 
A perpetual assurance solution must continually deal with overlapping 
sources of uncertainty and may need to treat these sources in a compos-
able fashion. 
R4: Derive new evidence A perpetual assurance solution must continually derive new assurance 
evidence arguments. 
R5: Integrate new evidence A perpetual assurance solution must continually integrate new evidence 
into the assurance arguments for the safe behavior of the assured self-
managing system. 
R6: Combine new evidence A perpetual assurance solution may need to continually combine new 
assurance evidence synthesized automatically and provided by human 
experts. 
R7: Provide evidence for the 
elements and activities that 
realize R1-R6  
A perpetual assurance solution must provide assurance evidence for the 
system components, the human activities, and the processes used to 
meet the previous set of requirements. 
 
R8: Produce timely updates The activities carried out by a perpetual assurance solution must pro-
duce timely updates of the assurance arguments. 
R9: Limited overhead The activities of the perpetual assurance solution and their overheads 
must not impact the operation of the assured self-adaptive system. 
R10: Auditable arguments The assurance evidence produced by a solution and the associated 
assurance arguments must be auditable by human stakeholders. 
4   Approaches to Realize Perpetual Assurances  
Several approaches have been developed in the previous decades to check whether a 
software system complies with its requirements. Important relevant research in this 
context is models at runtime [4][9]. In this section, we give a brief overview of repre-
sentative approaches. In the next section, we elaborate on mechanisms to make these 
approaches suitable to support perpetual assurances for self-adaptive systems, driven 
by the requirements described in the previous section. Table 3 gives an overview of 
the approaches we discuss, organized in three groups: human-driven approaches 
(manual), system-driven (automated), and hybrid (manual and automated).  
Table 3 Approaches for assurances 
Group Approaches 
  
Human-driven approaches - Formal proof 
- Simulation  
System-driven approaches - Runtime verification 
- Sanity checks 
- Contracts 
Hybrid approaches - Model checking 
- Testing  
4.1   Human-Driven Approaches  
We discuss two representative human-driven approaches for assurances: formal proof, 
and simulation.   
Formal proof is a mathematical calculation to prove a sequence of connected theo-
rems or formal specifications of a system. Formal proofs are conducted by humans 
with the help of interactive or automatic theorem provers, such as Isabelle or Coq.  
Formal proofs are rigorous and unambiguous, but require from the user both detailed 
knowledge about how the self-adaptive system works and significant mathematical 
experience. Furthermore, formal proofs only work for highly abstract models of a 
self-adaptive system (or more detailed models of small parts of it). Still the approach 
can be useful to build up assurance evidence arguments about basic properties of the 
system or specific elements (e.g., algorithms). We give two examples of formal proof 
used in self-adaptive systems. In [68], the authors formally prove a set of theorems to 
assure atomicity of adaptations of business processes in cross-organizational collabo-
rations. The approach is illustrated in an example where a supplier wants to evolve its 
business process by changing the policy of payments. In [71][72], the authors formal-
ly prove a set of theorems to assure safety and liveness properties of self-adaptive 
systems. The approach is illustrated for data stream elements that modify their behav-
ior in response to external conditions through the insertion and removal of filters. 
Simulation comprises three steps: the design of a model of a system, the execution of 
that model, and the analysis of the output. Different types of models at different levels 
of abstraction can be used, including declarative, functional, constraint, spatial or 
multi-model. A key aspect of the execution of a model is the way time is treated, e.g., 
small time increments or progress based on events. Simulation allows a user to ex-
plore many different states of the system, without being prevented by an infinite (or at 
least very large) state space. Simulation runs can provide assurance evidence argu-
ments at different levels of fidelity, which are primarily based on the level of abstrac-
tion of the model used and the type of simulation applied. As an example, in [19] the 
authors simulate self-adaptive systems and analyze the gradual fulfillment of re-
quirements. The approach provides valuable feedback to engineers to iteratively im-
prove the design of self-adaptive systems. 
4.2   System-Driven Approaches 
We discuss three representative system-driven approaches for assurances: runtime 
verification, sanity checks, and contracts.  
Runtime verification is a well-studied lightweight verification technique that is 
based on extracting information from a running system to detect whether certain 
properties are violated. Verification properties are typically expressed in trace predi-
cate formalisms, such as finite state machines, regular expressions, and linear tem-
poral logics. Runtime verification is less complex than traditional formal verification 
approaches, such as model checking, because only one or a few execution traces are 
analyzed. As an example, in [56] the authors introduce an approach to estimate the 
probability that a temporal property is satisfied by a run of a program. The approach 
models event sequences as observation sequences of a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) 
and uses an algorithm for HMM state estimation, which determines the probability of 
a state sequence. 
Sanity checks are calculations that check whether certain invariants hold at specific 
steps in the execution of the system. Sanity checks have been used for decades be-
cause they are very simple to implement and can easily be disabled when needed to 
address performance concerns. On the other hand, sanity checks provide only limited 
assurance evidence arguments that the system is not behaving incorrectly. As an ex-
ample, in [59], the authors present an approach to manage shared resources that is 
based on an adaptive arbitrator that uses device and workload models. The approach 
uses sanity checks to evaluate the correctness of the decisions made by a constraint 
solver.  
Contracts. The notion of Contract (introduced by B. Meyer in Design by Contract in 
Eiffel) makes the link between simple sanity checks and more formal, precise and 
verifiable interface specifications for software components. Contracts extend the 
ordinary definition of abstract data types with pre-conditions, post-conditions and 
invariants. Contracts can be checked at runtime as sanity checks, but can also serve as 
a basis for assume-guarantee modular reasoning. In [10] the authors have shown that 
the notion of functional contract as defined in Eiffel can be articulated in four layers: 
syntactic, functional, synchronization and quality of service contracts. For each layer, 
both runtime checks and assume-guarantee reasoning are possible. 
4.3   Hybrid Approaches 
We discuss two representative hybrid approaches to provide assurances: model check-
ing and testing.   
Model checking is an approach allowing designers to check that a property (typically 
expressed in some logic) holds for all reachable states in a system. Model checking is 
typically run offline and can only work in practice on either a high level abstraction of 
an adaptive system or on one of its components, provided it is simple enough. For 
example, in [25], the authors model MAPE loops of a mobile learning application in 
timed automata and verify robustness requirements expressed in timed computation 
tree logic using the Uppaal tool. The models and properties are concrete instances of a 
set of reusable formal templates for specifying MAPE-K loops [26]. To deal with 
uncertainty at design time and the practical coverage limitations of model checking 
for realistic system, several researchers have studied the application of model check-
ing techniques at runtime. E.g., in [13] QoS requirements of service-based systems 
are expressed as probabilistic temporal logic formulae, which are then automatically 
analyzed at runtime to identify and enforce optimal system configurations. The ap-
proach in [43] applies model checking techniques at runtime with the aim of validat-
ing compliance with requirements (expressed in LTL) of evolving code artifacts.    
Testing allows designers to check that the system performs as expected for a finite 
number of situations. Inherently testing cannot guarantee that a self-adaptive system 
fully complies with its requirements. Testing is traditionally performed before de-
ployment. As an example, in [18] the authors introduce a set of robustness tests, 
which provide mutated inputs to the interfaces between the controller and the target 
system, i.e. probes. The set of robustness tests are automatically generated by apply-
ing a set of predefined mutation rules to the messages sent by probes. Traditional 
testing allows demonstrating that a self-adaptive system is capable of satisfying par-
ticular requirements before deployment. However, it cannot deal with unanticipated 
system and environmental conditions. Recently, researchers in self-adaptive systems 
have started investigating how testing can be applied at runtime to deal with this chal-
lenge. In [34], the authors motivate the need and identify challenges for the testing of 
self-adaptive systems at runtime. The paper introduces the so-called MAPE-T feed-
back loop for supplementing testing strategies with runtime capabilities based on the 
monitoring, analysis, planning, and execution architecture for self-adaptive systems. 
5   Mechanisms to Make Perpetual Assurances Working 
Turning the approaches of perpetual assurances into a working reality requires tack-
ling several issues. The key challenge we face is to align the approaches with the 
requirements we have discussed in Section 1.2. For the functional requirements (R1 to 
R7), the central problem is how to collect assurance evidence arguments at runtime 
and compose them with the evidence acquired throughout the lifetime of the system 
possibly by different approaches. For the quality requirements (R8 to R10) the central 
problem is to make the solutions efficient and support the interchange of evidence 
arguments between the system and users. In this section, we first elaborate on the 
implications of quality requirements on approaches for perpetual assurances. Then we 
discuss two classes of mechanisms that can be used to provide the required function-
alities for perpetual assurances and meet the required qualities: decomposition mech-
anisms and model-driven mechanisms. 
5.1   Quality Properties for Perpetual Assurances Approaches 
The efficiency of the approaches for perpetual assurances must be evaluated with 
respect to the size of the self-adaptive system (e.g., number of components in the 
system) and the dynamism it is subject to (e.g., the frequency of change events that 
the system has to face). An approach for perpetual assurances of self-adaptive systems 
is efficient if, for systems of realistic size and dynamism, it is able to: 
 
¥ Provide results (assurances) within defined time constraints (depending on 
the context of use);  
¥ Consume a limited amount of resources, so that the overall amount of con-
sumed resources over time (e.g. memory size, CPU, network bandwidth, en-
ergy, etc.) remains within a limited fraction of the overall resources used by 
the system.  
¥ Scale well with respect to potential increases in size of the system and the 
dynamism it is exposed to. 
 
In the next sections, we discuss some promising mechanisms to make approaches for 
perpetual assurances work. Before doing so, it is important to note that orthogonal to 
the requirements for perceptual assurance in general, the level of assurance that is 
needed depends on the requirements of the self-adaptive system under consideration. 
In some cases, combining regular testing with simple and time-effective runtime 
techniques, such as sanity checks and contract checking, will be sufficient. In other 
cases, more powerful approaches are required. For example, model checking could be 
used to verify a safe envelope of possible trajectories of an adaptive system at design 
time, and verification at runtime to check whether the next change of state of the 
system keeps it inside the pre-validated envelope. 
5.2   Decomposition Mechanisms for Perpetual Assurances Approaches 
The first class of promising mechanisms for the perpetual provisioning of assurances 
is based on the principle of decomposition, which can be carried out along two di-
mensions: 
1. Time decomposition, in which:  
a. Some preliminary/intermediate work is performed off-line, and the actual as-
surance is provided on-line, building on these intermediate results; 
b. Assurances are provided with some degree of approximation/coarseness, and 
can be refined if necessary. 
2. Space decomposition where verification overhead is reduced by independently 
verifying each individual component of a large system, and then deriving global 
system properties through verifying a composition of its component-level proper-
ties. Possible approaches that can be used to this end are:  
a. Flat approaches, that only exploit the system decomposition into compo-
nents; 
b. Hierarchical approaches, where the hierarchical structure of the system is 
exploited;  
c. Incremental approaches targeted at frequently changing systems, in which 
re-verification are carried out only on the minimal subset of components af-
fected by a change. 
 
We provide examples of state of the art approaches for each type.  
5.2.1   Time Decomposition  
We consider two types of time decomposition: i) partially offline, assurances provid-
ed online, and ii) assurances with some degree of approximation.  
Time decomposition: partially offline, assurances provided online. In [32] and 
[20], the authors propose approaches based on the pre-computation at design time of a 
formal and parameterized model of the system and its requirements; the model pa-
rameters are then instantiated at runtime, based on the output produced by a monitor-
ing activity. Parametric probabilistic model checking [40] enables the evaluation of 
temporal properties on Parametric Markov Chains, yielding polynomials or rational 
functions as evaluation results. Instantiating the parameters in the result function, 
results for quantitative properties, such as probabilities or rewards can be cheaply 
obtained at runtime, based on a more computationally costly analysis process carried 
out offline. Due to limitations in practice of the parametric engines implemented in 
tools such as PARAM [40] or PRISM [46], the applicability of this technique may 
provide better results in self-adaptive systems with static architectures (or with a lim-
ited number of possible configurations), since dynamic changes to the architecture 
might require the generation of parametric expressions for new configurations. 
Time decomposition: assurances with some degree of approximation.  Statistical 
model checking [39][49][69] is a kind of simulation approach that enables the evalua-
tion of probability and reward-based quantitative properties, similarly to probabilistic 
model checking. Specifically, the approach involves simulating the system for finitely 
many executions and using statistical hypothesis testing to determine whether the 
samples constitute statistical evidence of the satisfaction of a probabilistic temporal 
logic specification, without requiring the construction of an explicit representation of 
the state space in memory. Moreover, this technique provides an interesting tradeoff 
between analysis time and the accuracy of the results obtained (e.g., by controlling the 
number of sample system executions generated) [70]. This makes it appropriate for 
systems with strict time constraints in which accuracy is not a primary concern. 
Moreover, dynamic changes to the system architecture do not penalize resource con-
sumption (e.g., no model reconstruction is required), making statistical model check-
ing a good candidate for the provision of assurances in highly dynamic systems.  
Initial research that uses statistical techniques at runtime for providing guarantees in 
self-adaptive systems is reported in [42][64].   
5.2.2   Space Decomposition  
We consider three types of space decomposition: i) flat approaches, ii) hierarchical 
approaches, and iii) incremental approaches.  
Space decomposition: flat approaches. In [47], the authors use assume-guarantee 
model checking to verify component-based systems one component at a time, and 
employs regular safety properties both as the assumptions made about system compo-
nents and the guarantees they provide to reason about probabilistic systems in a scala-
ble manner. [52] employs probabilistic interface automata to enable the isolated anal-
ysis of probabilistic properties in environment models (based on shared sys-
tem/environment actions), which are preserved in the composition of the environment 
and a non-probabilistic model of the system. 
Space decomposition: hierarchical approaches. The authors of [45] and [48] con-
sider the decomposition of models to carry out incremental quantitative verification. 
This strategy enables the reuse of results from previous verification runs to improve 
efficiency. While [48] considers decomposition of Markov Decision Process-based 
Models into their strongly connected components (SCCs), [45] employs high-level 
algebraic representations of component-based systems to identify and execute the 
minimal set of component-wise re-verification steps after a system change. 
Space decomposition: incremental approaches. In [16], the authors use assume-
guarantee compositional verification to efficiently re-verify safety properties after 
changes that match some particular patterns, such as component failures. 
5.2.3   Discussion  
The discussed decomposition mechanisms lend themselves to the identification of 
possible division of responsibilities between human-driven and system-driven activi-
ties, towards the ultimate goal of providing guarantees that the system goals are satis-
fied. As an example, considering time decomposition approaches based on parametric 
model checking, the adopted parametric models can result from a combination of 
human-driven activities and artifacts automatically produced from other sources or 
information (architectural models, adaptation strategy specifications, etc.). Similarly, 
in case of space decomposition approaches based on assume-guarantee compositional 
verification, the assumptions used in the verification process could be automatically 
"learned" by the system [58], or provided by (or combined with input from) human 
experts. 
5.3   Model-based Mechanisms for Perpetual Assurances Approaches 
For whatever division of responsibilities between human and systems in the perpetual 
assurance process, an important issue is how to define in a clean, well-documented 
and traceable way the interplay between the actors involved in the process. Model-
driven mechanisms can be useful to this end, as they can support the rigorous devel-
opment of a self-adaptive system from its high-level design up to its running imple-
mentation. Moreover, they can support the controlled and traceable modification by 
humans of parts of the system and/or of its self-adaptive logic, e.g. to respond to mod-
ifications of the requirements to be fulfilled. In this direction [61] presents a model-
driven approach to the development of adaptation engines. This contribution includes 
the definition of a domain-specific language for the modeling of adaptation engines, 
and a corresponding runtime interpreter that drives the adaptation engine operations. 
Moreover, the approach supports the combination of on-line machine controlled adap-
tations and off-line long-term adaptations performed by humans to maintain and 
evolve the system. 
Steps towards the definition of mechanisms that can support the human-system inter-
play in the perpetual assurance process can also be found in [41]. The authors propose 
an approach called ActivFORMS in which a formal model of the adaptation engine 
(MAPE-K feedback loop) based on timed automata and adaptation requirements ex-
pressed in timed computation tree logic are complemented by a suitable virtual ma-
chine that can execute the models, hence guaranteeing at runtime the compliance of 
properties verified offline. The approach allows dynamically checking the adaptation 
requirements, complementing the evidence arguments derived from human-driven 
offline activities with arguments provided online by the system that could not be 
obtained offline (e.g., for performance reasons). The approach supports deployment 
of new models at runtime elaborated by human experts to deal with new goals. 
6   Benchmark Criteria for Perpetual Assurances  
This section provides benchmark criteria to compare different approaches that provide 
perpetual assurances. We identify benchmark criteria along four aspects: capabilities 
of approaches to provide assurances, basis of evidence for assurances, stringency of 
assurances, and performance of approaches to provide assurances.  The criteria cover 
both functional and quality requirements for perpetual assurances techniques.  
6.1   Capabilities of Approaches to Provide Perpetual Assurances  
The first benchmark aspect compares the extent to which approaches differ in their 
ability to provide assurances for the requirements (goals) of self-adaptation. We dis-
tinguish the following benchmark criteria: variability (in requirements and the system 
itself), inaccuracy & incompleteness, conflicting criteria, user interaction, and han-
dling alternatives.  
Variability. Support for variability of requirements is necessary in ever-changing 
environments where requirements are not statically fixed, but are runtime entities that 
should be accessible and modifiable. An effective assurance approach should take 
into account requirements variations, including addition, updating, and deletion of 
requirements. For instance, variations to service-level agreement (SLA) contract spec-
ifications may have to be supported by an assurance approach. Variations may also 
involve the system itself, in term of unmanaged modifications; that is, an assurance 
approach should support system variability in terms of adding, deleting, and updating 
managed system components and services. This process may be completely automatic 
or may involve humans. 
Inaccuracy & incompleteness. The second benchmark criterion deals with the capa-
bility of an assurance approach to provide evidence with models that are not 100% 
precise and complete. Inaccuracy may refer to both system and context models. For 
instance, it may not be possible to accurately define requirements at design time, thus 
making it necessary to leave a level of uncertainty within the requirements. On the 
other hand context models representing variations to context elements may be inaccu-
rate, which may affect the results of an assurance technique. Similarly, incomplete-
ness may either concern system or context models. For instance, either new services 
or new context elements may appear only at runtime. An assurance technique should 
provide the best possible assurance level regarding inaccurate and incomplete models. 
Additionally, an assurance approach may support re-evaluation at runtime when the 
uncertainty related to inaccuracy and incompleteness is solved (at least partially).  
Competing criteria. Assurance approaches should take into account possible com-
peting criteria. While it is desirable to optimize the utility of evidence (coverage, 
quality) provided by an assurance approach, it is important that the approach allows 
making a tradeoff between the utility of the evidence it provides and the costs for it 
(time, resource consumption).   
User interaction. Assurance is related also to the way users interact with the system, 
in particular with respect to changing request load and changing user pro-
files/preferences. For instance, when the request load for a service increases, the as-
sured level of availability of that service may be reduced. Self-adaptation may recon-
figure the internal server structure (i.e., adding new components) to maintain the 
required level of assurance. In the case of changing user preference/profile variations, 
the level of assurances may either have to be recomputed or they may be interpreted 
differently. An assurance technique should be able to support such variations in the 
ways the system is used.  
Handling alternatives is another important benchmark criterion for assurance of self-
adaptive systems. An assurance technique should be able to deal with a flat space of 
reconfiguration strategies but also with one obtained by composition. In this context 
an important capability is to support assurances in the case one adaptation strategy is 
pre-empted by another one.  
6.2   Basis of Assurance Benchmarking  
The second aspect of benchmarking techniques for perpetual assurances defines the 
basis of assurance, i.e., the reasons why the researchers believe that the technique 
makes valid decisions. We consider techniques based on historical data only, projec-
tions in the future only, and combined approaches. In addition, we consider human-
based evidence as a basis for assurance.  
Historical data only. At one extreme, an adaptation decision can be solely based on 
the past historical data, e.g., [12][17][28][29][33][64]. An issue with such adaptive 
systems is that there may be no guarantees that the analyses based on historical data 
will be reified and manifested in the future executions of system. Nevertheless, in 
settings where the past is a good indicator of the systemÕs future behavior, such ap-
proaches could be applicable.  
Projections into the future only. At the other extreme, a system may provide assur-
ances that project into the future, meaning that the analysis is based on predictive 
models of what may occur in the future. The predictions may take different forms, 
including statistical methods e.g., ARIMA-based forecasting approaches [2][3][21] 
and fuzzy methods to address the uncertainty with which different situations may 
occur [30][38][51]. A challenge with this approach is the difficulty of constructing 
predictive models. 
Combined approaches. Finally, in many adaptive systems, combinations of the 
aforementioned techniques are used, i.e., some past historical data is used together 
with what-if analysis of the implications of adaptations over the predicted behaviors 
of the system in its future operation.  
Human-based evidence. Since users may be involved in the assurance process, we 
consider human-based evidence as a further basis for assurance. Input from users may 
be required before performing adaptations, which may be critical in terms of provided 
services. Consider a situation in which a self-adaptive service-oriented system needs 
to be reconfigured by replacing a faulty service. Before substituting this service with a 
new one, selected by an automated assurance technique, the user may want to check 
its SLA to confirm its suitability as a replacement according to a criterion that cannot 
be easily applied automatically. Such a criterion may be subjective, not lending itself 
to quantification. Thus, by means of accepting the SLA of the new service, the user 
provides a human-based evidence to complement the assurances provisioned through 
an automated technique, which can be based on past historical data, predictive models 
or a combination of both. 
Discussion. When publishing research results, it is important to explicitly discuss and 
benchmark the basis of assurances. For instance, if historical data is used for making 
decisions, the research needs to assess whether past behavior is a good indicator of 
future behavior, and if so, quantify such expectations. Similarly, if predictive models 
are used for making decisions, the researchers need to assess the accuracy of the pre-
dictions, ideally in a quantitative manner.  
6.3   Stringency of Perpetual Assurances  
A third important benchmarking aspect of techniques for perpetual assurances of self-
adaptive systems is the nature of rationale and evidence of the assurances, which we 
term Òstringency of assurances.Ó The rationale for assurances may differ greatly de-
pending on the purpose of the adaptive system and its users. While for one system the 
only proper rationale is a formal proof, for another system, proper rationale may be 
simply statistical data, such as the probability with which the adaptation has achieved 
its objective in similar prior situations. For example, a safety-critical system may 
require a more stringent assurance rationale than a typical consumer software system. 
Note that the assurance rationale is a criterion that applies for different phases of 
adaptation (monitoring, analysis, planning, and execution). Different phases of the 
same adaptive system may require different level of assurance rationale. For instance, 
while a formal proof is a plausible rationale for the adaptation decisions made during 
the planning phase, it may not be appropriate for the monitoring phase. Similarly, 
confidence intervals for the distribution of monitored system parameters may be a 
plausible rationale for the monitoring phase, but not necessarily for the execution 
phase of a self-adaptive software system.   
6.4   Performance of Approaches to Provide Perpetual Assurances  
Finally, for an assurance approach to be applicable in real-world scenarios it is essen-
tial to evaluate its performance, which is the fourth and final proposed benchmark 
aspect. We consider a set of benchmarks, which directly follow from efficiency and 
scalability concerns discussed in Section 4, namely timeliness, computational over-
head, and complexity analysis.  
Timeliness. The time required to achieve the required evidence is a key performance 
benchmark criteria, which is obvious for techniques that are used at runtime.  
Computational overhead. Related to timeliness is the computational overhead, i.e., 
the consumed resources (e.g., memory and CPU) for enacting the assurance approach.   
Complexity analysis. As each assurance technique has an (implicit) complexity that 
may affect its applicability in terms of the analysis required for a problem at hand, we 
propose a complexity analysis benchmark. Assurance techniques may be bench-
marked in terms of their scope of applicability across different types of problems.  
The following table summarizes the benchmark aspects, and for each of them the 
different benchmark criteria.  
 
Table 4 Summary benchmark aspects and criteria 
Benchmark Aspect   
Benchmark Criteria 
Criteria Description 
  
Capabilities of 
approaches to 
provide assurances 
Variability 
Capability of an approach to handle variations in re-
quirements (adding, updating, deleting goals), and the 
system (adding, updating, deleting elements) 
Inaccuracy & in-
completeness 
Capability of an approach to handle inaccuracy and 
incompleteness of models of the system and context 
Competing criteria 
Capability of an approach to balance the tradeoffs 
between utility (e.g., coverage, quality) and cost (e.g., 
time, resources) 
User interaction 
Capability of an approach to handle changes in user 
behavior (preferences, profile) 
Handling alterna-
tives 
Capability of an approach to handle changes in adapta-
tion strategies (e.g., pre-emption) 
Basis of assurance 
benchmarking 
Historical data only 
Capability of an approach to provide evidence over time 
based on historical data 
Projections in the 
future 
Capability of an approach to provide evidence based on 
predictive models 
Combined ap-
proaches 
Capability of an approach to provide evidence based on 
combining historical data with predictive models 
Human evidence 
Capability of an approach to complement automatically 
gathered evidence by evidence provided by humans 
Stringency of  
assurances 
Assurance rational 
Capability of the approach to provide the required 
rational of evidence for the purpose of the system and its 
users (e.g., completeness, precision) 
Performance of 
approaches 
Timeliness 
The time an approach requires to achieve the required 
evidence. 
Computational 
overhead 
The resources required by an approach (e.g., memory 
and CPU) for enacting the assurance approach. 
Complexity 
The scope of applicability of an approach to different 
types of problems. 
 
Some of the benchmark criteria from Table 4 directly reflect a specific requirement 
from Table 2. For example, the ÔTimelinessÕ criterion is directly linked to requirement 
R8 (ÔProduce timely updatesÕ). Other criteria relate to multiple requirements from 
Table 2. As an example, the ÔHuman evidenceÕ criterion links to R5 (ÔIntegrate new 
evidenceÕ), R7 (ÔProvide evidence for human activities that realize R5Õ), and R10 
(ÔAuditable argumentsÕ). Finally, some arguments only link indirectly to the require-
ments from Table 2. This is the case for the ÔHandling alternativesÕ criterion, which 
relates to the solution for self-adaptation and this solution may provide different lev-
els of support for the requirements of perpetual assurances.      
7   Example Case   
We now present a case that supports the evaluation, comparison, and ranking of ap-
proaches for perpetual assurances. The example case has been conceived to challenge 
the capability of approaches for self-adaptation to achieve perpetual provisioning of 
assurances for different requirements driven by the benchmark criteria discussed in 
the previous section. The particular ways in which different approaches solve the 
challenges proposed by the example case offers two distinct advantages. First it al-
lows comparing prototypal research efforts, and second it acts as a testbed to demon-
strate the effectiveness of the different techniques adopted by the different self-
adaptive solutions.  
We start with motivating the domain of the case and provide a set of general adapta-
tion scenarios. The scenarios are linked to the types of uncertainty occurring in self-
adaptive systems and the requirements for perpetual assurances. Next we describe the 
concrete case. We then give generic adaptation scenarios and explain benchmark 
criteria. Finally, we illustrate a comparison of two approaches for a concrete scenario. 
7.1   Domain and General Adaptation Scenarios  
The case comes from the domain of service-based systems, in which software services 
offered by third-party providers are dynamically composed at runtime to deliver com-
plex functionality. Service-based systems are widely used in e-commerce, online 
banking, e-health and many other types of applications. They increasingly rely on 
self-adaptation to cope with the uncertainties that are often associated with third-party 
services [6][13][14][20][64] as the loose coupling of service-oriented architectures 
makes online reconfiguration feasible. Hence, the example case is a prototypical ap-
plication. 
A typical service-based system consists of a composition of web services that are 
accessed remotely through a software application called a workflow engine. Several 
providers may offer services that provide the same functionality, often with different 
levels of performance, reliability, costs, etc. Service providers can register concrete 
services at the service registry. The workflow of a composite service finds addresses 
(end points) of concrete services via the service registry. The way in which a work-
flow engine employs concrete services in order to provide the functionality required 
by the user is specified in the workflow that the engine is executing.  
Table  5 lists a set of generic adaptation scenarios for service-based systems. These 
scenarios provide increasing challenges to self-adaptation in general and the provision 
of perpetual assurances in particular. They are not meant to be exhaustive, but cover 
typical types of adaptation problems with different types of uncertainties.  
Adaptation scenarios differ based on the characteristics summarized below.   
Types of uncertainties that the system needs to handle: different types of uncer-
tainty present different challenges to adaptation solutions and to the approaches used 
for perpetual assurances; for example monitoring or quantifying uncertainty (R1 and 
R2 in Table 2) associated with the failures of an individual service may be less chal-
lenging than integrating a new type of service that becomes available.   
 
Types of requirements that the self-adaptive system must meet: self-adaptation 
can be used to achieve different types of system requirements.
2
 Scenarios with a sin-
gle requirement are typically less challenging for assurance approaches than scenarios 
where multiple competing requirements need to be balanced. Different combinations 
of requirements pose different challenges to perpetual assurances; e.g., monitoring, 
quantifying, and integrating new evidence (R1, R2, and R5) may be more demanding 
for requirements that require real-time tracking, while managing overlapping uncer-
tainty resources (R3) and combining new evidence (R6) may be particularly challeng-
ing for collecting evidence of interdependent requirements.  
 
Table 5 Generic adaptation scenarios for service‐based systems 
Scenario Type(s) of 
uncertainty 
Type(s) of 
requirements 
Observable properties Types of adaptations 
(examples) 
S1 Individual 
service failure 
 
Reliability Success or failure of 
each service invocation 
(Boolean Ð true=success, 
false=failure) 
Select equivalent ser-
vice, invoke idempotent 
services in parallel, enact 
alternative service 
S2 Variation of 
quality-of-
service proper-
ty over time 
(e.g., response 
time)  
Quality of 
service (e.g. 
performance) 
Variations in the quality 
of service property (e.g.  
changes in the response 
time for each service 
invocation (ms)) 
Select equivalent ser-
vice, invoke idempotent 
services in parallel, enact 
alternative service 
S3 New alterna-
tive service 
becomes 
available 
Reliability, 
performance, 
cost 
Available services for 
each operation (Set of 
currently available 
services)  
Select new concrete 
service, enact new 
service 
S4 New type of 
service be-
comes availa-
ble, require-
ment for new 
functionality 
Add new 
service 
Request to add new 
functionality (String), 
available concrete ser-
vices including services 
for the new functionality 
(Set of currently availa-
ble services) 
Adapt workflow, enact 
adapted workflow, select 
new concrete service, 
enact new service 
 
 
Observable attributes/properties: the observations of the system and its execution 
context (R1 to R7) that are required depend on scenario, and introduce different chal-
lenges for adaptation solutions and approaches for perpetual assurances. For example 
monitoring the failures of a service is less demanding than observing the emergence 
of a new type of service (which may not have been anticipated upfront) and handling 
the request for integrating it into the system.  
 
Types of adaptations that are possible: different scenarios require different types of 
adaptations. As an example, handling service failures may involve trying equivalent 
services until an invocation completes successfully, while introducing a new type of 
service requires an adaptation of the service workflow. On the other hand, approaches 
may be available that offer different adaptation strategies; e.g., an alternative strategy 
                                                            
2 It is important to distinguish the requirements that the self-adaptive system needs to realize 
(reliability, performance, etc.) and the requirements for approaches of perpetual assurances. 
for reducing the likelihood of an operation failing may be executing multiple idempo-
tent services in parallel (and using the result returned by the successful execution that 
completes first).  
 
Different approaches to providing perpetual assurance should be evaluated and com-
pared based on: 
 
1. The benchmark aspects and criteria from Table 4. 
2. Their ability to handle the scenarios in Table 5 (or a subset of them). 
3. The quality of the adaptation for which they provide assurance, which can be 
evaluated as described in the existing literature, e.g., [60]. 
7.2   Tele Assistance System  
We now present the case. The concrete application is a Tele Assistance System (TAS) 
that offers health support to patients using home devices. The example case was pre-
sented as an exemplar at SEAMS 2015; for details we refer to [63]. A concrete reali-
sation of the application is available at the community website.3 TAS is based on the 
example introduced in [6] and later used in [13][29][56]. TAS offers a composite 
service that uses the following services: 
¥ Alarm Service, which provides the operation sendAlarm 
¥ Medical Analysis Service, which provides the operation analyzeData 
¥ Drug Service, which provides the operations changeDoses and changeDrug 
 
Multiple providers offer concrete services for the TAS with different characteristics, 
e.g. for reliability and cost. Each TAS implementation may use a particular strategy to 
select concrete services, e.g., based on the minimum response time.  
TAS executes the workflow shown in Figure 1. The system uses the sensors embed-
ded in a wearable medical device to takes periodical measurements of the vital pa-
rameters of a patient, and invokes the Medical Analysis Service for their analysis. The 
analysis result may trigger the invocation of the Drug Service to deliver new medica-
tion to the patient or to change his/her dose of medication, or the invocation of the 
Alarm Service, leading to an ambulance being dispatched to the patient. The Alarm 
Service can also be invoked directly by the patient by means of a panic button on the 
wearable device. 
7.3   Adaptation Scenarios and Benchmark Criteria 
We now provide instances of the generic adaptation scenarios from Table 5.  
Setting: The TAS can use one of several concrete services for each abstract service it 
requires. To select concrete services the workflow uses a service registry with service 
descriptions that is refreshed from time to time. A service description lists the maxi-
mum failure rate and maximum response time promised by the provider of the con-
crete service, and the cost per service invocation. 
                                                            
3 https://www.hpi.uni-potsdam.de/giese/public/selfadapt/exemplars/tas/ 
  
Figure 1. Workflow of the TAS [63] 
S1 - Individual service failure 
Without adaptation: Concrete service i that provides the sendAlarm operation is 
selected such that: 
(i) fri = min1≤ j ≤ n (frj), where frj is the promised maximum failure rate of the j-th 
concrete alarm services,  
(ii) costi is the minimum cost of the concrete Alarm Service options that satisfy (i). 
Uncertainty: The concrete services that provide the Alarm Service fail from time to 
time (we assume that there are at least two concrete alarm services).  
Adaptation requirement: The failure rate of workflow executions that consist of 
an invocation of the Alarm Service does not exceed a predefined value. 
With adaptation: The system observes each successful and failed Alarm Service 
invocation and dynamically selects the lowest-cost concrete service that meets the 
requirement. 
S2 - Variation of failure rate of services over time 
Without adaptation: A pair of concrete services that provide the Medical Analysis 
Service and Alarm Service is selected such that: 
(i) fr1 + fr2 <= X, where fr1 and fr2 are the promised maximum failure rates of the 
two selected services, and X is a pre-specified maximum failure rate of workflow 
executions comprising an invocation of the Medical Analysis Service followed by 
an invocation of the Alarm Service. 
(ii) cost1 + cost2 is minimal cost across all combinations of concrete Medical Analy-
sis Service and Alarm Service options that satisfy (i). 
Uncertainty: The failure rates of the concrete services that provide the Alarm Ser-
vice change significantly over time. 
Adaptation requirement: The system requirement of a maximum failure rate of 
workflow executions comprising an invocation of the Medical Analysis Service fol-
lowed by an invocation of the Alarm Service lower than or equal to X with minimal 
cost of service selections is maintained, regardless of the changing failure rates of 
concrete services over time. 
With adaptation: The system observes each successful and failed invocation of a 
Medical Analysis Service and Alarm Service, uses these observations to estimate 
the actual failure rates of the concrete services, and dynamically selects the lowest-
cost pair of concrete services that meets the requirement. 
S3 - New service becomes available 
Without adaptation: A concrete service that provides the Alarm Service is selected 
as in Scenario S1. The registry with service descriptions is periodically refreshed 
with a period T.  
Uncertainty: A new concrete service that provides the Alarm Service becomes 
available at some time t. 
Adaptation requirement: The failure rate of workflow executions that consist of 
an invocation of the Alarm Service does not exceed a predefined value X. 
With adaptation: The system observes each successful and failed invocation of an 
Alarm Service and dynamically selects the lowest-cost concrete service from the set 
of concrete alarm services, including, after refreshment of service descriptions, the 
new concrete service. 
S4 - New type of service becomes available 
Without adaptation: A concrete service that provides the Alarm Service is selected 
as in Scenario S1.  
Uncertainty: A new type of service called Inform Relatives becomes available at 
time t; the Inform Relatives service informs relatives of the patient in case of invo-
cations of the Alarm Service; concrete services of the Inform Relatives service are 
characterized by a cost. 
Adaptation requirement: After a time Δt a concrete service that provides the In-
form Relatives service is selected; the lowest cost concrete Inform Relatives service 
is invoked after every selection of an Alarm Service.  
With adaptation: The system discovers new Inform Relatives services, it integrates 
the corresponding abstract service in the workflow, caches the concrete instances of 
the new service, and dynamically selects the lowest-cost concrete service from the 
set of Inform Relatives services. 
For each of these scenarios, different benchmark criteria can be applied. For example, 
for Scenario S2, we may apply the benchmark variability (the capability of an ap-
proach to handle variations in requirements) by comparing the percentage of time 
solutions assure compliance of the requirement that the maximal failure rate of work-
flow executions is not violated when different distributions of changing failure rates 
of services are imposed. In Scenario S4, we may benchmark incompleteness by com-
paring the capability of an approach to provide partial assurances that a new service 
for contacting relatives is correctly integrated in the workflow. We may apply bench-
mark performance of approaches for different scenarios by comparing the cost of 
different approaches to assure compliance with the requirement at runtime, in terms of 
overhead in time, CPU, and memory. 
7.4   Concrete Example Scenario 
To conclude this section we illustrate the comparison of two approaches for perpetual 
assurances for a concrete scenario.   
Concrete setup. We use a scenario with an equal number of service instances for 
each of the three service types used by TAS. An overview of the profiles as declared 
by third-party service providers for a setup with five instances is shown in Table 6.  
Table 6 Third party service profiles for TAS scenario  
Service 
ID 
Alarm Service Medical Analysis 
Service 
Drug Service 
 Failure rate 
(h
-1
)  
Cost  
(¢) 
Failure rate 
(h
-1
) 
Cost 
(¢) 
Failure rate 
(h
-1
) 
Cost 
(¢) 
1 0.11 4.0 0.12 4.0  0.01 5.0 
2 0.04 12.0 0.07 14.0 0.03 3.0 
3 0.18 2.0 0.18 2.0 0.05 2.0 
4 0.08 3.0 0.10 6.0 0.07 1.0 
5 0.14 5.0 0.15 3.0 0.02 4.0 
 
Table 7 shows the distributions of requests in the TAS scenario.   
Table 7 Distribution of requests in the TAS scenario  
(as a fraction of all requests)  
Distribution user requests Distribution requests after analysis 
Checking vital signs Emergency request Drug service Alarm service 
0.75 0.25 0.66 0.34 
 
The service profile parameters and the distribution of requests are subject to uncer-
tainty. Concretely, we added uncertainty to the failure rates of services and the distri-
bution of requests based on a normal distribution.  
Requirements. The concrete requirements that should be fulfilled are:   
R1.  The failure rate of invocations of TAS per hour should be below 0.02.  
R2.  The average cost per invocation of TAS should be below 8.0 ¢.   
Hence, the scenario is a concrete instance of abstract scenario S1 (individual service 
failure) combined with scenario S2 (variation of failure rates of services over time).   
Approaches. We apply and compare two approaches for perpetual assurance: runtime 
quantitative verification (RQV) [13] and runtime statistical model checking (RSMC) 
[42]. RQV applies model-based evaluation of qualities using probabilistic verification 
techniques. Concretely, the approach models the TAS service system as a discrete-
time Markov chain and uses the PRISM model checker [46] at runtime to assure that 
service configurations are selected that comply to the requirements. The Markov 
model is parameterized by the configurable parameters of the service-based system 
(i.e., service profile parameters and distributions of requests to TAS) that are updated 
at runtime. During analysis the configurations that satisfy the quality requirements for 
the system are identified. The planner uses the analysis results to create a plan for 
adapting the configuration as needed. RQV assures that selected configurations com-
ply with the requirements. RSMC on the other hand applies model-based evaluation 
of qualities using statistical verification techniques. The approach models the TAS 
systems with stochastic timed automata and uses the Uppaal-SMC model checker [24] 
at runtime to select service configurations that comply to the requirements. Similar to 
the Markov model used with RQV, the stochastic timed automata model is parameter-
ized with service profile parameters and changing distributions of requests to TAS 
that are updated at runtime. RSMC checks the required properties of the model based 
on a sample set of simulations. RSMC uses statistical techniques to decide whether 
the system satisfies the property with some degree of confidence. During analysis the 
configurations that satisfy the quality requirements with a defined degree of confi-
dence are identified. The planner uses these configurations to create a plan for adapt-
ing the configuration as needed. Thus, in contrast to exhaustive approaches, such as 
RQV, RSMC does not provide 100% guarantees, but an estimation, which is bound to 
a confidence interval. On the other hand, by setting the verification parameters, 
SMCR allows to tradeoff between the accuracy and confidence of the guarantees it 
provides with the system resources it requires.  
The left-hand side of Figure 2 shows the failure rates obtained when RSMC was used 
for the concrete setup shown in Table 6 and Table 7. The boxplots show averages of 
20 runs over 5 hours (with approximately 1000 invocations per hour). We used four 
different settings of verification parameters E and A (RSMC Strategy). The value of E 
defines the approximation interval, i.e. [p - E, p + E] with p the probability that invo-
cations of TAS fail, and 1 - A is the confidence level for the result. The figure shows 
that the setting with A = 0.05 and E = 0.05 guarantees no violations of the failure rate 
with a confidence level of 95%. The results with more relaxed parameter settings 
provide a less accurate result with lower confidence levels, but the mean values for all 
considered strategies remain under the requirement constraint of 2%. The right-hand 
side of the figure shows that the time required to compute the verification results 
decreases when the accuracy and confidence of the results is lowered. The approach 
enables balancing the tradeoff between computation time and accuracy/confidence of 
runtime model checking.  
 
 Figure 2 Failure rates (left) and computation time (right) with RSMC  
We compared the adaptation time with RQV and RSMC for settings with an increas-
ing number of service instances for TAS.  Figure 3 shows the results of the experi-
ments. The graphs confirm that RSMC is more efficient in required computation time 
and scales better. However, RQV can provide strict guarantees for the requirements at 
hand, while the efficiency of RSMC comes at an expense since fewer simulations can 
lead to results with less accuracy and confidence. 
 
 
Figure 3 Adaptation time for RQV versus RSMC 
 
We summarize the comparison for RQV and RSMC for a set of applicable benchmark 
criteria defined in Table 4.   
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Table 8 Comparison benchmark criteria RQV versus RSMC 
Benchmark Criteria 
Criteria Description RQV RSMC 
 
Inaccuracy &  
Incompleteness 
Capability of an approach to 
handle inaccuracy and incom-
pleteness of models of the 
system and context 
Yes through the 
use of a parameter-
ized Markov model 
 
Yes by using a 
parameterized 
stochastic timed 
automata with 
configurable verifi-
cation parameters 
Conflicting criteria 
Capability of an approach to 
balance the tradeoffs between 
utility (correctness) and cost 
(verification time, memory) 
Exact approach; no 
support to balance 
correctness versus 
verification time 
Tradeoff between 
accuracy and confi-
dence and required 
verification time 
and memory 
Combined approaches 
Capability of an approach to 
provide evidence based on 
combining historical data with 
predictive models 
Both approaches provide evidence based 
on the prediction of expected behavior 
based on past observed data 
Timeliness 
The time an approach requires to 
achieve the required evidence. 
Exhaustive ap-
proach; expected to 
be limited to 
smaller modes than 
RSMC 
Configurable based 
on setting of verifi-
cation parameters 
 
8   Conclusions   
Assuring requirements compliance of self-adaptive systems that have to operate under 
uncertainty calls for an enduring process where evidence is collected over the whole 
lifetime of the system. We coined this process as perpetual assurances for self-
adaptive systems. We summarize the key challenges to realize perpetual assurances. 
First, we need a better understanding of the nature of uncertainty for software systems 
and how this poses requirements for providing perpetual assurances. This paper pro-
vides an initial list of requirements for perpetual assurances based on a proposed 
classification of uncertainties. Additional research is required to test the validity and 
coverage of this set of requirements.  
Second, we need a deeper understanding of how we can handle uncertainty in self-
adaptive systems, and in particular, how can we monitor and quantify uncertainty. 
Currently, there is a growing understanding of how to handle uncertainty regarding 
parameters of the system, its goals, and the environment. However, how to handle 
uncertainty regarding parts of the system and the environment that may not be com-
pletely know upfront, or handling uncertainty regarding new goals remains to a large 
extent an open problem.  
Third, deriving, integrating and combining new evidence pose additional hard chal-
lenges. A variety of techniques for obtaining evidence for requirements compliance of 
software systems exist. However, most of these techniques have been conceived for 
offline use. Perpetual assurance requires continuously deriving, integrating and com-
bining new evidence, while the system is operating. We have presented decomposi-
tion and model-based mechanisms than can potentially pave the paths to go forward. 
However, making these mechanisms effective is particularly challenging and requires 
a radical revision of many of the existing techniques. 
Last but not least, to drive research on assurances for self-adaptive systems forward, 
we need good exemplars. Exemplars enable comparison of different solution, pinpoint 
the critical challenges, and demonstrate the effectiveness of the different mechanisms 
adopted by the self-adaptive solutions. The case used in this paper that is further ex-
plained in [63] provides one exemplar in the domain of service-based systems.  
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